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FOREWORD 
The State of Black Omaha 1978 was the first of an on-
going series of annual reports to be published by the Urban 
League of Nebraska, Inc. Each report will appear during the 
first weeks of January. 
The following sections of the present document were 
authored by Dr. Manuel Martinez, Director of Research and 
Development, Urban League of Nebraska, Inc.; Introduction 
and Parts I through IV. That author wishes to express his 
sincere appreciation to the numerous individuals who con-
tributed to the development of these sections of the work. 
The Recommendations section was authored by Mr. George 
Dean, Executive Director, Urban League of Nebraska, Inc. 
That author wishes to express his heartfelt appreciation to 
those who contributed to the development of the recommen-
dations contained in this section. 
The work was produced by Mr. Dean. 
GD 
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INTRODUCTION 
In his State of Black America 1976 message, Vernon 
Jordan, National Urban League President, stated: 
Black America is in a state of cr1s1s. 
By any of the accepted indicators of 
progress -- employment, housing, educa-
tion, etc. -- many of the gains blacks 
made over the past decade were either 
wiped out or badly eroded in 1975, and 
the portents for the future are not en-
couraging.! 
In 1978, this statement holds no less true for 
Black Omaha than it did for Black America in 1976. All 
socio-economic indicators show that this segment of 
American Society is in a deep state of depression. More-
over, little concern has been evident on the part of local 
officials for reversing this state of affairs. 
To gain an indication of the standing of the black 
population of this community, this report examines the 
areas of education, employment, welfare, housing, health 
and political representation as they hold for Blacks re-
siding in this city. In each case, the standing's 
criterion employed is a compar1son between the status of 
Omaha's Blacks on the one hand and Omaha's whites on the 
other. The standing of one group is considered compara-
lrhe State of Black America 1976. 
YOrk: The~at1onal Urban League, 
Vernon Jordan. 
Inc., 1977 
New 
tively impaired if, in proportional terms, it ~s twice 
less favorable than the standing of the otl1er. (Through-
out this study, this assessment approach is referred-to as 
the Criterion of ComEarative Standings.) 
As will become apparent, in every instance the status 
of Blacks compares unfavorably, to an alarming degree, with 
·that of the white majority population. 
This report consists of five (5) parts: Description 
of Omaha, Blacks in Omaha, the State of Black Omaha, Dis-
cussion, and Recommendations. 
I. DESCRIPTION OF OMAHA 
Omaha, the largest City in Nebraska, is located on 
the East-Central part of the State, along the western bank 
of the Missouri River. The City, encompassing 78 square 
miles, has a population of 372,000. The Omaha Standard 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA), comprising Douglas 
and Sarpy Counties in Nebraska, to the west; and Pottawattamie 
County in Iowa, to the east, encompasses 1,458 square miles 
with a population of 558,746. 1 
The city dates back to 1825, when, following Lewis 
!Regional Housing Plan Technical Appendix Report No: 112-3, 
Vol. I. Omaha, NE: Omaha-Council Bluffs $1etrop0THan 
Area Flanning Agency, 1973. 
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and Clark's 1804 conference with local Indians, Jean 
Pierre Cabanese set up a trading post on the city's 
present site. In 1846-47 the Mormons, on their way to 
Utah, spent the winter here, setting up the area's first 
settlement. In 1854, Indians ceded the present Douglas 
County to the United States, Omaha-was officially incor-
porated as a city three years later. 
Omaha has grown steadily from the time of its in-
ception. Two major factors contributing to this steady 
growth have been the Union Pacific Railroad and Missouri 
River traffic, both of which have contributed significantly 
in making the city a major transportation and shipping 
center. 
Today, Omaha forms one of the nation's larger meat-
packing centers and is one of the nation's and the world's 
larger markets for livestock. It has a number of important 
food-processing plants, grain elevators and stockyards. 
Oil refineries, a lead smelter and factories manufactur-
ing farm implements make up part of its diverse industry. 
The Mutual of Omaha Insurance firm and Strategic 
Air Command Headquarters are located within the metropoli-
tan area, as are the regional headquarters of the Farm 
Credit Administration and the Reconstruction Finance 
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Corporation. 
Eleven (11) miles to the west lies Boystown, the 
flourishing youth community founded by Father Ed¥ard J. 
Flanagan 1n 1917. 
In terms of the socio-economic standing of the 
majority of its ~esidents, Omaha today is one of the more 
viable metropolitan areas in the nation. It was ranked 
12th in family income among the nation's 50 largest cities.l 
(For 1978 median family income for this city is projected 
to be $15,000.2) Furthermore, unemployment in Omaha in 
1978 is projected to be 4%, as opposed to 6 ~ 7% for the 
rest of the nation.3 A final indicator of the community's 
viability may be found in its crime incidence, which is a low 
22,412; that of other major U.S. cities averages 35,239. 4 
It might be expected that such dynamic statistics 
would reflect upon the quality of life of all of the city's 
inhabitantsi-that Omaha, going by its high standing among 
the nation's major cities, would indeed reflect upon all 
its citizens the state's slogan, "The Good Life." But 
Iu.s. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1977. 
2Marketing Economic Guide. N.Y.: Marketing Economics 
InstHute, 1977. 
3Nebraska L~part~=nt of Labor, 1977. 
4Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1976. 
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sucK is not the case, as becomes manifest upon a v1ew of 
the mind-boggling discrepancies in living conditions ex-
isting between the city's white majority and the city's 
black minority. Certainly, "The Good Life" has not come 
to black residents of Omaha as is readily apparent upon 
an examination of historical and current data. 
I I. BLACKS IN m1AHA 
Blacks began arriving 1n large numbers in Omaha 
from southern states around the turn of the century. By 
1879 there were 789 Blacks living in the Omaha area. In 
the main, they worked as construction laborers with the 
Union Pacific Railroad, Burlington and Midland Pacific.l 
Today, more than 40,000 Blacks reside in the Sl-!SA, 
comprising 7 - 8% of the SMSA population. More than 34,800 
Blacks reside within the incorporated city limits, com-
prising 9- 10% of the incorporated city's population.2 
Omaha black - white relations have been punctuated 
lThe Negroes of 
Company, 1940." 
Center, 1940. 
Nebraska. Lincoln, NE: Woodruff Printing 
Copyr1ght: Omaha Urban League Community 
2Regional Housi:12: Plan Technical APpendix, Report No. 
112-3, Vol. I. Om~ NE: Omaha-Council Bluffs ~letro­
pohtanllTanniag Agency, 1973, p. 15. (Figures adjusted 
by MAPA for 1978.) 
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by a,number of unhappy and turbulent events. One such 
occurrence took place on September 29, 1919, when Will 
B·.-own, a Black male alleged to have raped a 1-1hite girl, 
was taken by a white mob from city jail and lynched, The 
man was hanged by the neck from a light pole in the down-
town area, whereupon the mob opened fire upon the writhing 
body, riddling it with some 60 bullet holes. Presently, 
Brown's body was cut down; set on fire; and dragged, tied 
by a rope to the rear bumper of an automobile, through 
the city's main thoroughfares. During the lynching's 
early stages, then-Mayor Edward P. Smith attempted to 
intervene, crying, "I will not give up the Negro! I will 
give my life protecting the law!" He nearly did. He was 
seized by the mob, beaten to near unconsciousness and hanged. 
He was rescued by police before full strangulation had 
taken place, but not before the mob set one police car 
afire. 
During the disturbance, another crowd, worked up ~o 
an apogee of frenzy, burned down the county court house 
building. A t!drd crowd, equipped with firearms, marched 
upon the black residential area; blacks there were forced 
to resort to the use of gunfire to keep the mob at bay. 
The full-scale riot was eventually quelled with the 
- 6 -
' ' assistance of 1,000 soldiers rushed 1n from nearby 
garrisons.l 
Twenty-eight (28) years earlier, another Black, 
James Smith, accused of having attacked a white woman, 
had been taken by a white mob from the city's jail and 
lynched.2 
Racial disturbances erupted sporadically during the 
late sixties, when Blacks were demanding a stronger voice 
in the societal decision-making process. 
III. THE STATE OF BLACK m!AHA 
Today, no signs of racial unrest are evident in the 
city. As a matter of fact, a recent city-wide survey 
conducted by a local commercial broadcasting station showed 
that race relations, as a perceived problem, ranks tenth, 
after such areas of preoccupation as recreation, trans-
portation and city sewers.3 Indeed, one city official 
has boasted that "Omaha today is host to one of the neater, 
more law-abiding black ghettoes in the country." 
Yet, beneath a veneer of tranquility, portentous 
signs are discernible that in the area of comparative 
!The Omaha Daily Nel-IS, Monday, September 29, 1919, p.l 
2Ibid, p. 5 
3omaha, NE: Chronicle Broadcasting Company (W0\'1-T), 1977. 
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racial standings, something lS very much wrong ln this 
city; tltat a pernicious ind unchanging quality pervades 
the lives of Blacks residing here. 
To gain a perspective from which to view the quality 
of life of Omaha's Blacks, it is well to refer to the work 
of sociologists N. Fantini and C. Weinstein. These workers 
proposed that a "cycle of despair" tends to develop among 
a people when its members are denied full mobility in such 
areas as education, employment, adequate living conditions 
and political participation. A strong, continuing defici-
ency in any of these areas can begin and/or perpetuate the 
cycle.l 
This conceptualization, with some modifications, is 
illustrated below: 
Lack of Educational 
Opportunities 
Lowered ~ 
Political Participa- /fi ~ 
tion/Representation ,· ' { \ 
~ -~ lack of Fmploymo»' Skill> 
Demoralization "'- } Unemployment and/or 
'---- / Underemployment 
Substandard 
Living Conditions 
lFantini, M. and Weinstein, C. 
Challenge to Education. N.Y.: 
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The Disadvantaged: A 
Harper & Row, 1968, 
The net effect of the conditions associated with 
this cycle is two-faceted: (1) diminished participation 
in social, economic and political decision-making processes; 
and (2), decreased access to benefits derivable from. the 
products of society. 
As the analysis to follow shows, this phenomenon is 
today all too apparent \-Ji thin Omaha's Black community. 
Following is an examination of the facets of the cycle of 
dispair as they presently apply to Omaha's ~lack sector. 
EDUCATION 
In the areas of primary, secondary and post-secondary 
education, Black Omaha is in a crisis state. 
The Omaha Public School System (OPS) consists of 
some 100 primary, "middle", and secondary schools with 
an enrollment of 53,527 pupils. The student racial com-
position is 22% Black; 75% White; and 3% Hispanic, Native 
American and Oriental.l 
Until as recently as 1975, OPS was segregated. In 
that year, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor 
of the U.S. Department of Justice concerning a desegregation 
order issued earlier to OPS by that federal agency. OPS 
!Elementary and Secondary School Civil Rights Survey. 
Omaha Public School System Report, 1976-77 School Year. 
Omaha, NE: OPS, 197i. -----
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has since then complied with the desegregation order, while 
at the same time vigorously appealing the court's current 
decision. To date, the appeal process has run up a legal 
bill in excess of $300,000. 
The resistance of OPS to desegregation is perhaps 
manifested in the disproportionate number of black students, 
integrated into the OPS, who were suspended from school 
for one or more days during the 1976-77 school year. 
During this time, 1,735 out of 11,831 black students were 
suspended. This figure represents 15% of the black student 
population. By contrast, only 1,990 out of 39,978 white 
students were suspended for one or more days during the 
same period. 1 This figure represents 4% of the white stu-
dent population. (Note the 1:4 white-to-black suspension 
ratio between these two percentages.) 
Given the obviously unfavorable atmosphere for Blacks 
extant in OPS, it is not surprising that fully SO% of 
Blacks_ currently eligible for primary and secondary educa-
tion have dropped out of school altogether. By contrast, only 
28% of whites currently eligible for school have done so.Z 
libid. 
2Regional Housing Plan Technical Index Report No. 112-4, 
Vol. II. Omaha, NE: Omaha-Council Bluffs Netropohtan 
Planning Agency, 1975. 
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Of the total number of Black individuals 25 years 
of age and older, only 29% have completed high school. By 
contrast, approximately 601 of the majority population in 
the same age group have completed secondary schooling.! 
These comparative figures concerning primary and 
secondary school are bleak indeed; those concerning post-
secondary education are bleaker. Of eligible Blacks, 
only 7% have completed one to three years of college; 
only 3% have completed four or more years. By contrast, 
of eligible whites, 26% have completed one to three years 
of college and 13% have completed four or more years. 2 
(Note the 4:1 ratio between these percentages for whites 
and blacks.) 
Going by the criterion of comparative standings, 
in terms of educational opportunities Black Omaha is 
critically deficient. In this respect, one facet of the 
cycle-of-despair has clearly come into being for black 
residents of this city. 
EMPLOYMENT 
So has ~ Sycond facet. Omaha's black labor force 
- 11 -
consists of 16,623 individuals, of whom 2,691, or 17%, are 
officially unemploycd.l It 1nay be pointed out that this 
figure is based on the number of individuals who report 
to the State Labor Department as unemployed. The Urban 
League of Nebraska, Inc., recognizes that, for a variety 
of reasons, many unemployed Blacks do not report to an 
official agency. The number of such persons has been 
estimated to be slightly larger than the number of those 
who do report. The sum of these two figures is termed 
"the hidden unemployment index'' (HUI). By use of the HUI, 
it is estimated that the actual unemployment rate among 
Blacks in this area is 35-40%. 
For comparative purposes, although the HUI is ob-
viously the more accurate measure, the official index may 
be employed. As previously noted, unemployment for whites 
in Omaha is officially 4%, or nearly half that of the 
national average, while that for Blacks is 17%. Thus 
officially, a 1:4.25 \vhi te-te-black unemployment percentage 
ratio exists in the city. (Note again the 1:4 white-to-
black contrast.). 
lAnnual Planning Report: FY 1978. Omaha, Lincoln, NE: 
Nebraska Department of Labor, Division of Employment, 
1977. 
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It would seem that to say that 17~ of black Omahans 
are unemployed is to say that 831 are employed. And this 
inference might cause some to g1ve a sigl1 of relief con-
cerning the supposed 83% of blacks who work. However, 
such a view is misleading. First, when the hidden unem-
ployment index is taken into account, it becomes clear 
that the black employment rate is not 83%, but 60-65%. 
Secondly, any consolation from the fact that, at least, 
a majority of eligible Blacks are employed, quickly dis-
appears when the level of monetary remuneration for Blatk 
workers here is examined. The median income for a Black 
family of four in Omaha is $7,500, 1 as opposed to $15,0ooi 
for white Omahans. 
Thus, it is not surprising that 42% of the Black 
Omaha population has been officially declared to be 
economically disadvantated; only 9% of whites have been 
so declared. Here a 1:4.66 white-to-black ratio surfaces. 3 
(Again, note the 1:.4 contrast.) 
lu.s. Census Bureau, as reported by CBS News Alumnae, 
1978, p.736; figure for 1975, adjusted for inflation 
by ULofN at the.rate of 6% per year. 
2Marketing Econo~ics Guide. N.Y.: Marketing Economics 
Institute, 1977. 
3
u.s. Census Bureau. 
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The economic plight of Black Omaltans is further 
highlighted by the number of Black Hclfarc recipients J..n 
this city. Thirty (30%) percent of Blacks required some 
sort of welfare assistance in 1976-77, as opposed to 2.36% 
of whites.l The Hhite-to-black percentage ratio here is 
1:12.7. 
Unemployment J..n Black Omaha is likely related to the 
already noted lack of educational opportunities that exist 
for Blacks in this city. Of 1,743 indiyiduals referred 
by the Urban League of Nebraska, Inc., to local employers 
in 1977, only 380 or 22% were hired. One major reason for 
this low success rate is surmised to be a low job-readiness 
level on the part of a large segment of this population. 
A comparison of job ~ypes most frequently requested by 
clients of the Urban League and corresponding job availabi~ 
lity in the local employment market indicates that the supply 
of jobs requested by ULofN clients does not meet the demand 
for such jobs in the Omaha area. For example, the work type 
most frequently requested by clients is that of general 
factory Hork. ~he average annual job openings in this area 
is 288 (projected through 1985.) In 1977, the number of 
persons applying with the Nebraska Job Service for this 
loouglas County Social Services Statistical Report 1976-
17. Omaha, NE: Douglas County Weltare AdministratJ..on, 
D77. 
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type of work was in excess of 1,214. Thus, a conservative 
1:4.3 application-to-availability ratio exists for factory 
work. Clearly, the type of work requested most frequently 
by ULofN clients lS one which ls not readily available to 
accommodate most applicants. 
On the other hand, ULofN clients are underqualified 
for those jobs available ln sufficient numbers to accom-
modate most job applicants. For example, the average 
number of job openings in the professional, technical and 
managerial fields, projected through 1985, is 2,487.1 In 
1977, the active number of applicants for jobs in this area 
was 2,132, or 355 less than the number of available jobs. 
Few ULofN clients were found to be qualified for these types 
of jobs during that year. 
The high secondary school drop-out rate and low 
college-preparation rate among Black Omahans clearly re-
flects upon the low preparation level in these areas of 
employment. 
In the area of employment, as in the area of educa-
tion, the criterion of comparative standings shows a 
critical deficiency in the viability of Omaha's Black 
Community. 
!Employment Trends. Omaha, NE: Nebraska Job Service, 1977. 
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HOUSING 
In housing, too. In theory, the two cycle-of-despair 
facets of poor educational mobility and unemployment are 
expected to result in a lowering in the standard of living 
conditions. This prediction holds true for Omaha's Black 
citizens. 
Approximately 95% of Omaha's Black residents are con-
centrated into an 8-square mile ghetto on the Northeast 
sector of the city. This is an area in which, as an average, 
16 persons per square acre reside, as opposed to an average 
of .60 persons per s4uare acre in the SMSA. ~he white-to-
black person-per-square-acre ratio is 1:13. 1 
The already noted low economic viability of the Black 
community is reflected in the relatively low average-value 
of housing units in Northeast Omaha. This value is $7,000, 
in contrast to $28,000 for the white sector,2 for a 4:1 
white-to-black ratio. Thirty (30%) percent of all housing 
units in the area are deteriorated, as opposed to 9% of 
housing units in the white sector. 3 
!Regional Housing Plan Technical Aopendix Reoort No. 112-3 
Vol. ~Omaha, NE: Omana-Council i3lutfs ~letropolitan 
Area Planning Agency, 1976. 
21976 ICES Population and Housing Estimates. Omaha, NE: 
Omaha-city Plann~ng Department, 19ii. 
3Regional Housing Plan Technical Appendix Report No. 112-3 
Vol. I. Omaha, NE: Omaha-Council Blutfs ~Ietropolltan 
Area Planning Agency, 1976. p. 59. 
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No relief for this slum-condition is 1n view. Pre-
sently, a major freeway thoroughfare is being planned for 
the city, to cut throtagh the heart of the Black community. 
The exact trajectory of the freeway has not been made clear. 
This prospect, involving as it does the disruption of a large 
segment of the area's physical configuration; and being 
riddled as it is with uncertainty as to where this upheaval 
is likely to take place, is not conducive to committment on 
the part of public or private housing developers to implement 
housing renewal programs 1n the area.l Consequently, housing 
demolition in some parts of the area continues at an unabated 
demolition-to-construction ratio of 5:1. At last count, over 
2,500 usable vacant lots were going to waste 1n the Black 
city sector.l 
Housing conditions are so poor in Black Omaha -- and 
hope for improvement so remote -- that in a recent city-wide 
survey conducted by city officials fully 43% of the city's 
Black residents expressed an urgent desire to leave the 
area.2 
HEALTH 
To gain an indication of the quality of living con-
ditions of a community, housing standards are only one set 
lrbid, p.61 
2rbid, p.6o 
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of considerations to be taken into account. Hatters con-
cerning l1caltl1 also arc iinportant determinants of the 
quality of life of a people. 
In the area of health, as 1n all otl1er areas so far 
examined, the vitality of the Black Omaha community has 
already deteriorated beyond the critical point. The infant 
mortality rate for Omaha's Blacks is 31:5 per 1,000 births. 
For Omal1a's whites, it is 13:9 per 1,000 births. This figure 
represents a white-to-black infant mortality proportion ratio 
of 1:2.27. 
The national white-to-black birth death ratio, as 
alarming as it is, compares "favorably" \vith that of Omaha. 
At the national level, the Black infant mortality rate is 
26.5 per 1,000 births. For whites it is 14.5. This re-
presents a national white-to-black ratio of 1:1.83, as 
opposed to the local contrast of 1:2.27. It is interesting, 
and telling, to note that in this respect, Blacks at the 
local level fare wo~se than Blacks at the national level 
(31.5 rate for local Blacks vs 26.5 for Blacks nationally) 
while local white? fare slightly better than whites at the 
national level (13.9 rate_for local whites as opposed to 
14.5 for whites nationally).! 
lomaha, NE: Health Planning Council of the Midlands, 1978. 
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These figures point to a basic problem attending the area 
of health services within Omaha's bl3ck commu~ity. Accord-
ing to the lle3l th PLmning Council of the ~lid lands (llPGl), 
at least two (2) factors seriously undermine participation 
in health-care programs on the part of the disadvantaged 
of this city: 
Many llPC~l residents have difficulty knowing 
where and how to access many health-related 
services. Distance from service centers can 
cause under-utilization of existing services 
.... (Furthermore), reluctance in requesting 
available service is often due to fear, un-
certainty, or the inability to clarify con-
crete needs or previous fruitless attempts 
to locate the proper source of the appro-
priate service.l 
This condition applies particularly to those who 
have been 
medically disengaged from the health care 
system due to socio-economic, educational 
or ethnic barrlers. lltallcs audcd.)2 
The above paragraphs form a too-accurate account 
of health~care accessibility in Black Omaha. According 
to the 1973 Housing Survey3 the majority ~f the city's 
1Plan Development Committee Phase V & VI Report. Omaha, 
NE: Health Planning Council ot the Miulands, 1976. p.lS. 
2Ibid 
3omaha-Council Bluffs Metropolitan Planning Agency, 1973 1 p.64 
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Black residents cited a definite need for more doctors 
and hospitals in the city's black sector. 
In 1978, this need is yet to be met. No major 
health care facilities exist ln the black ghetto, while 
hospitals of the city lie at distances not readily 
accessible to an area in which fully 45% of residents 
lack automobiles.*! 
Going by the criterion of comparative standings, in 
terms of housing and health services Black Omaha exists 
under crisis conditions. It is obvious that~ third 
facet of the cycle of despair- has closed in on this sector 
of the city. 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
So have the fourth- and fifth facets. According to 
Fantini and Weinstein, 2 demoralization and lowered poli-
tical participation should be expected to follow upon the 
heels of low educational opportunities, high unemployment 
and substandard living conditions. This theoretical 
expectation has been realized within Omaha's black community. 
*This figure compares unfavorably with that of the white 
sector, which is 15%. (The ratio here is 1:3.) 
lrbid, p.6o 
2op cit. 
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During the ~lay, 1977, general elections, of approximaccly 
21,000 Blacks eligible to vote, only 2,000, or 11~, voced. 
By contrast, 45', of eligible l>hite voters throughout the 
city did so. The ~hite-to-black voter participation per-
centage ratio is 4:1.* (Note once again the pervasive 
4:1 ratio.) 
In Omaha, only three elected Black officials are 
serving in office. Of these, two are occupying non-
political (school board) positions. One is serving in 
a political (state senate) capacity. 
The reasons for the low political participation 
record existing on the part of Black Omahans are not hard 
to find. Black non-participants queried by the Urban Leauge 
gave the following reasons for their non-involvement in 
the political process: 
ir 
l) "I did not think I was eligible to vote." 
2) "I am not familiar with voting procedures 
and cannot bother to take the trouble to 
find out what· they are." 
3) "I have not seen anyone worth voting for." 
4) "Voting is a lot of crud. You know it's 
not going to do us any good." 
5) "Politicians are a bunch of crooked racists." 
Data compiled by the Urban League of Nebraska, Inc., from 
public records. 
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For the 1~1ost p~nt, those responses point to a sense 
of dispair concer11ing tl1c socio-political decision-making 
process -- a fatalistic attitude traceable to a loss of 
confidence in the social system. 
For practical purposes, effective political repre-
sentation does not exist in Black Omaha. Worse, the over-
whelming majority of Omaha's black citizens have dropped 
out of the political system. Thus, the final facets of 
the cycle of despair have become apparent within this 
city's black community: The final indicators- appear that 
Black Omaha is, indeed, in a deep state of depression 
economically, politically, and spiritually. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
The information analyzed indicates that the Black 
residents of this city are not reaping their share of 
benefits in the areas of education, employment, housing, 
health and political representation.* For each of the 
areas examined, in all favorable instances, the proportion 
*Interestingly, a recent survey conducted by the Urban 
League of Nebraska, Inc., within Omaha's Black community 
showed that employment, political representation, educa-
tion, housing and health services are among the six (6) 
most urgent problem areas concerning Black Omahans today. 
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of whites benefitting frcm tlte favorable condition is, as 
an average, at luast four (4) times greater than the pro-
portion of Blacks. On the other hand, in all unfavorable 
instances the proportion of Blacks suffering the brunt 
of the unfavorable condition is as an average, at least 
four (4) times greater than the proportion of whites. The 
following simple diagram gives an approximate visual 
representation of this state of affairs: 
Approximate 
Visual Representation of 
White-to-Black Ratios in the Areas 
of Social Benefits and Social 
Disadvantages for Residents 
of Omaha 
I""' 
r-"B"l-a-c'k-s-'· 
Blacks 
l'lhl. te s _j 
Benefits Disadvantages 
A net effect associated with this situation is a 
sense of despair on the part of the Black community, mani-
fested in the co~paratively high drop-out rates in the 
areas of education (60%), employment (17%) and political 
participation (90%). 
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Employing an adaptation of the cycle-of-despair 
concept of Fantini :md \\'einstein as a frcuae of refE-rence 
from which to view the State of Black O:naha; and using the 
notion of the criterion of comparative standings to assess 
the status of Black Omahans in view of resources available 
in the city, the conclusion, based on data analyzed, is 
that Black Omaha 1s, for all intents and purposes, moribund. 
In closing his State of Black America 1976 statement, 
Vernon Jordan wrote: 
The implications of (the State of Black 
America) should not be lost on the American 
people, for the future of this nation is 
bound up in how it deals with these problems. 
To be remembered is that other societies have 
disintegrated when they ignored signs of spread-
ing poverty and disenchantment among their people. 
It can happen in America but it does not have to. 
The hour is late but there is yet ti1ne to set 
the American house in order. 
The hour is late in Omaha, particularly 1n.v1ew of 
the fact that Blacks here are becoming increasi11gly aware 
of (and discontented with) the disparity in the quality 
of life existing between the white Omaha sector (one of 
the more prosperous in the nation) and the Black Omaha 
sector (one of the more depressed in the nation.) The 
question must be raised: Given this tremendous disparity 
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and g1vcn the increasing lc~el of black awareness, how 
long can the i;lack Omaha co":munity be expected to continue 
to be "one of the neater, more la1:-abiding ghettoes in 
the nation"? The racial disturbances of the 'sixties 
and the more recent activities in New York City during the 
Blackout of last July, should give an indication of the 
extent to which a people are willing to exist under con-
ditions such as those afflicting this city's Black popula-
tion. 
Whether leaders 1n government and industry in this 
metropolitan area can effectively utilize what little time 
remains to set tl1e Omahan house in order remains to be 
seen. Certainly, it is obvious that only through the most 
vigorous efforts on the part of these individuals, as well 
as on the part of the Black leadership, will life be infused 
into this sad and politically neglected segment of our city. 
Like Mr. Jordan's previous documents, this report· 
concludes with a number of recommendations that the Urban 
League of Nebraska, Inc., strongly urges those in positions 
of trust to consider, in addressing the problems that have 
been identified. 
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RECO:P.·!ENDA TI 0)! S 
EDUCATION 
1) An intensive program 011 the importance of remaini11g in 
school shoulJ begin immediately. This progra1a should 
be formulated by Omaha Public Schools in cooperation 
with the Urban League of Nebraska, Inc., and other 
community groups and leaders. 
2) The OPS Board should stop all attempts to appeal the 
decision of the Eighth Circuit Court, as it pertains 
to the desegregation order, and begin devoting time 
and resources to insuring a quality education for 
all children in the district. 
3) A Task Force should be established, composed of OPS 
personnel and community leaders, to study the problem 
of the high suspension, expulsion and drop-out rate 
of Black students. This Task Force would also be 
charged with providing solutions, including new and 
innovative approaches to discipline other than sus-
pension. 
4) A meaningful Affirmative Action Plan for OPS should be 
established that will insure the hiring and use of more 
minorities as counselors, administrators and principals, 
especially at the high school level. 
5) A meaningful education program directed at all faculty 
It 
and administrators in OPS should be implemented to 
familiarize these individuals with the cultural-
psychological differences between white and Black 
students. This program would also serve the additional 
purpose of improving the the attitudes of such individuals 
toward Black students.* 
Such a program has been proposed and developed by Dr. 
Virgil Clift, of the University of Nebraska at Omaha's 
College of Education. It is recommended that concerned 
individuals consult this program and lend it their support. 
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6) A Citi:cJJS 1 Task Force, appointed by the Board of 
Educ:1tion, shoul,l te est:1blisllc.i to rwni tor the 
acti\·iticcs of school aut!Jorities in th~ arc:l of 
curriculc:;;~ dcvclo~';:lcnt and the. inclusio.> of :Hack 
students in extra curricula activities. 
7) The developntent of a public school construction policy 
should be initiated that will promote and enhance the 
re-development of the Near Northside in conjunction 
with the efforts of other governmental agencies. This 
would also serve to reduce the disproportionate burden 
on Black students in the context of the present dese-
gregation plan. 
8) More Black parental involvement in the education process 
of their childre11. This sl1ould include their visiting 
the schools and meeting with faculty, involvement in 
PTA activities, participating in school Board meetings 
and constantly reminding the students of the importance 
of academic excellence. 
9) A large-scale adult education program, designed to 
qualify Blacks to receive the GED should begin immed-
iately. This should be done jointly by OPS, ~iTCC, u;;o 
and Creighton in cooperation with comnunity groups. 
10) UNO, Creighton University and the College of St. ~!ary's 
sho~ld actively recruit Black students to enter their 
institutions. Funds should be earmarked specifically 
for Black students to enhance their registration, re-
tention and graduation in these institutions of higher 
learning. 
ll) UNO, Creigl1ton University, MTCC and the College of St. 
Mary's should design and assist with education programs 
for youth between the ages of 17-27 who are now unemployed. 
These programs should be technical and vocational in 
nature and s~ould provide training which will lead to 
meaningful employment. 
12) A strong Affirmative Action Plan on the part of each 
institution of higher learning to insure that there 
are more Black administrators and faculty members hired. 
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D!FLOYO!E.'JT 
13) A Full Employt~cnt Policy that would guarantee every 
Omahan a job v:i10 v.ants to l'iOrl: shoulJ be a <lop ted as 
local policy. Sucl1 a policy would include ccrumittment 
from both ~overnmcnt and business that this would be-
come a reality. 
14) A ne\'1 and sincere conu:littment to affirmative action 
should be adopted by government and business. This 
committment should include meaningful goals and time-
tables and a dedicated effort to insure that they are 
reached. 
15) Effective utili:ation of federal manpol'ier dollars in 
addressing the problems of Black une@ployment in the 
.Omalta area. This shculJ include more involvement on 
the part of the r:tinori tv cocnaunity based "organi:ations 
in operation of manpower programs. 
16) A large-scale training program should be implemented 
to prepare unemployed Black Omaltans for jobs projected 
to be available through the next decade. Funding for 
this type of program would come from both public and 
private funds. 
17) A dedicated committment on the part of government and 
industry that the high unemployment rate among Blacks 
in Omaha will be greatly reduced by the end of 1978. 
18) A closer working relationship between the Greater 
Omaha Chamber of Commerce and minority businesses and 
community organizations in addressing the needs of 
the.Black unemployed. 
19) Closer scrutiny by government and business and in-
dustry to i:1sure that their minimum requirements are 
not screenin& out qualifiable applicants. 
HOUSING 
20) A real committment on the part of local government 
in conjunction with private sector on re-developing 
the Near Northside. This would include the alloca-
tion of a greater proportion of Community Development 
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Block Grant funds to the :>:c:u l\orthside. 
21) The ii;Il\cdiatc cli;.linatioi: of red.linin" as it pertains 
to the i':e:n ::ort:L'>ide. 
22) A cooperative arr3n~e:•:cnt on the p~rt of financial 
lending institutions si1~uld be implemented in order 
to make incre~scd ilOinc loans availab!c to ~ear North-
side residents. This arran;e~cnt would reduce the 
financial risk of any one lending institution. 
23) ~lore involvement by the City of Omaha in the federally 
sponsored Honcsteading Act in order to allow more In-
dividual hoii\e ownership for low and moderate 1ncome 
Blacks. 
24) Provide incentives to private builders to invest in 
the re-development ot the ~ear Northside. 
25) Increased enforcement of City Codes to insure that 
absentee landlords are making their properties suit-
able for living. 
26) Increased efforts of City Government in clearing of:: 
vacant lots. This could be done in cooperation with 
civic groups and community based orgunizations. 
27) Make more money available for home improvements grants 
and loans for Near Northside homeowners. 
28) Greater involvement on the part of community resi-
dents in the planning for the re-development of the 
Near Northside. 
29) The promulgation of a policy by City Government, of 
restricting Near Nortl1side displacement. (There is 
a growing belief that if and when the Near ~orthside 
is re-developed it will be re-developed after its 
present Black residents have been displaced.) 
HEALTH 
30) The number of health care facilities located on the 
Near Northside of Omaha should be increased. 
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31) Funds shoulJ be 1~1:;de :t\':'iL1ble to insure tl::: t a pro-
gram is i1:~plcr.~~·n:c:d tb.:t h'ill provide a.Jequ~·Lc pre-
natal car~ to ~11 CXJicctant mothers. Tl1is will in-
clude wiJe-sprc~J publicity on the important of proper 
pre-natal c:1Te. 
32) On-going health seTvices should be establsihed, that 
will address routine health problem3 of residents of 
the NeaT Northside. This could possibly be done throuch 
the use of mobile units equipped to treat minor ailments. 
33) A massive immunization pTogram that will enhance the 
possibility of all citi=ens being properly immunized. 
34) More community education programs dealing with the 
importance of proper heill ch. This could be done in 
cooperation witl1 the.Urban Leag110 of Nebraska, Inc., 
the ~ledical Schools and other health service delivery 
agents. 
35) A permanent Task Force be established to review and 
advocate for le~islation concerning the implementatioJJ 
of health services for the Near NoTthside and to 
monitor the practices of ntajor health services agencies 
in the city as they rela~e to Black Omahans. 
POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 
36) The immediate adoption of legislation calling for 
the election of City Councilpersons by district. 
37) The appointment of Black citizens to all Boards and 
Commissions under the jurisdictions of City and 
Courity government. 
38) Funds be Qade available for the establishment of an 
on-going program designed to stress the importance 
of Blacks participating in the political pTocess. 
This could be done through the combined efforts of 
the two major political parties in cooperation ~ith 
the Urban League of Nebraska, Inc., and otheT commu-
nity groups. 
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39) In cooperation witll the El~ction Cowmissioncr's 
Office, an ()n-~oi:1:: \-otin;: registration drive be 
started on tih· :<c:,r \ort!1side. 
40) Voter EJtlcation Secinars be conducted on a regular 
basis tl1rou~hout tl1c rear. This could be done through 
the combined efforts of the two Jnajor political parties, 
the League of \\'o;;ten Voters and other comr.mni ty groups. 
41) An intense "get out the vote" campaign on each election 
day. 
42) The establish:nent of a closer working relationship 
between persons in position of political leadership 
j jc 
and the Black co:.~:O!Ui1ity. This ~·;ill enhance the possi-
bility of politicians being more sensitive to the needs 
of their Black constituents. 
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